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A	 key	 reform	 that	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 the	 international	 criminal	 justice	 project	
stronger,	more	efficient	and	more	effective	is	the	consideration	of	peace	negotiations	as	
an	 additional	 factor	 in	 the	 Prosecutor’s	 decision	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 pursue	 an	
investigation	or	prosecution	‘in	the	interests	of	justice’,	in	accordance	with	Article	53(1)(c)	
and	 2(c)	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute.	 At	 present,	 this	 would	 require	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 Policy	
Papers	 issued	 on	 this	 question,	 in	 particular,	 the	 2013	 Policy	 Paper	 on	 Preliminary	
Examinations	 and	 the	 2007	 Policy	 Paper	 on	 the	 Interests	 of	 Justice.	 Significantly,	 such	
reform	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 prevent	 or	 alleviate,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 some	 of	 the	 most	













and	 international	 humanitarian	 law,	 retributive	 justice	 in	 the	 form	 of	 criminal	




and	 judicial,	particularly,	 criminal,	 accountability	mechanisms	–	 cannot	be	conducted	at	
the	same	time.	Indeed,	in	some	circumstances,	the	situation	of	violence	or	conflict	on	the	
ground	 may	 be	 so	 extreme	 that,	 for	 peace	 to	 be	 ultimately	 achieved,	 the	 judicial	 or	
prosecutorial	 component	 can	 only	 start	 after	 certain	 minimum	 conditions	 are	 secured	
through	 a	 politically	 negotiated	 process.	 Even	 in	 cases	 where	 violence	 has	 been	
temporarily	contained,	the	situation	may	be	so	uncertain	or	unstable	that	the	initiation	of	
criminal	 proceedings	 could	 jeopardize	 what	 has	 been	 achieved	 so	 far	 through	 a	 peace	
negotiation.	This	would	most	likely	occur	when	those	accused	in	the	criminal	proceedings	
are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 effectively	 conduct	 the	 peace	 talks	 or	 to	 influence	 the	 situation	 of	
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in	 the	 very	 interests	 of	 justice	 in	 the	 long-run	 that	 certain	 criminal	 proceedings	 are	
temporarily	set	aside	so	that	peace	negotiations	can	be	attempted.3		
Fourth,	 a	 prosecutorial	 policy	 that	 takes	 those	 considerations	 into	 account	 can	
contribute	 to	preventing	or	 remedying	 some	of	 the	 challenges	 that	 the	Court	 currently	
faces	 as	 regards	 state	 cooperation,	 budgetary	 constraints	 and	 lengthy	 or	 complex	
procedures.	This	is	because,	as	we	will	explain	in	more	detail	later	on,	by	knowing	that	the	
Prosecutor	has	the	ability	and	willingness	to	defer	an	investigation	or	prosecution	for	the	




Prosecutor	 can	 avoid	 the	 initiation	 of	 criminal	 proceedings	which,	 at	 a	 certain	 point	 in	
time,	 would	 be	 too	 cumbersome	 or	 costly	 in	 the	 face	 of	 difficult	 security	 or	 political	
conditions	on	the	ground.	Furthermore,	if	the	political	solution	turns	out	to	be	successful	
both	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 attainment	 of	 peace	 and	 with	 regard	 to	 instilling	 local	 justice	
mechanisms	which	might	 be	 of	 the	 restorative	 variety,	 no	 investigation	 or	 prosecution	
might	need	to	be	initiated	at	all.4		
	
2. The	 legal	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘interests	 of	 justice’	 under	 Article	 53(1)(c)	 of	 the	
Statute	
Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 our	 argument.	 As	 has	 been	 extensively	 discussed	
elsewhere,	Article	53(1)(c)	and	2(c)	allows	the	Prosecutor	of	the	ICC	to	use	her	discretion	
for	 the	purposes	of	 temporarily	 setting	aside	a	 criminal	 investigation	or	prosecution	 ‘in	
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treats	the	 interests	of	 justice	as	countervailing	consideration	to	the	gravity	of	 the	crime	
and	the	interests	of	victims,5	which,	at	the	stage	of	the	initiation	of	a	formal	investigation,	
following	 preliminary	 examinations,	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 weigh	 in	 favor	 of	 criminal	










beneficial	 to	 international	 criminal	 justice,	 in	 the	 pursuance	 of	 its	 diverse	 aims	 or	
functions,	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 such	 interests.	 Those	 functions	 include,	 in	 particular,	
retribution,	 crime	 deterrence	 and	 prevention,	 symbolic	 or	 expressive	 justice	 and	
reparations	 or	 restorative	 justice.9	 The	 same	 outcome	 would	 be	 justified	 by	 the	
multifaceted	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute,	 as	 reflected	 in	 its	 Preamble.10	
Similarly,	other	provisions	that	form	part	of	the	context	of	Article	53	of	the	Statute,	such	
as	Articles	13	and	16,	allow	criminal	proceedings	to	be	either	initiated	or	deferred	for	the	
purposes	 of	 upholding	 goals	 such	 peace	 and	 security	 and	 alternative	 justice	
mechanisms.11	 Thus,	 an	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 53(1)(c)	 and	 2(c),	 in	 accordance	 with	
Article	 31	 of	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 Treaties,	 would	 support	 a	 broad	
reading	of	the	‘interests	of	justice’,	including	all	factors	that	are	broadly	considered	to	be	
goals	of	international	criminal	justice,	in	all	of	its	functions.		
Furthermore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 the	 broad	 discretion	 enjoyed	 by	 the	
Prosecutor	under	Article	53(1)(c)	and	2(c)	 is	 countered	by	 the	mandatory	nature	of	 the	
judicial	review	of	her	decision	not	to	proceed	with	the	interests	of	justice,	in	accordance	
with	 Article	 53(3)(b)	 of	 the	 Statute.12	 This	 contrasts	 with	 the	 initiation	 of	 preliminary	
examinations	under	Article	15(1)	and	(2)	(which	has	no	mechanism	of	judicial	review)	and	
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of	 the	 Court	 and	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 case,	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 53(3)(a).	 This	 is	 yet	
another	indication	that	the	array	of	factors	that	can	be	considered	under	the	interests	of	
justice	 provision	 is	wider	 that	 those	 that	 come	within	 the	 scope	 of	 other	 discretionary	




or	 information.	This	demystifies	 the	common	assumption	that	stopping	an	 investigation	





Examinations	 and	 the	 2007	 Policy	 Paper	 on	 the	 Interests	 of	 Justice,	 the	 OTP	 does	 not	
presently	consider	that	peace	processes	or	other	 justice	mechanisms	can	be	considered	
by	 the	 Prosecutor	 when	 using	 her	 discretion	 not	 to	 initiate	 an	 investigation	 or	
prosecution.13	 Rather,	 these	 are	 said	 to	 be	 ‘complementary’	 to	 international	 criminal	
justice,	and	within	the	mandate	of	other	institutions.14	Only	those	factors	explicitly	listed	
in	 Article	 53(1)(c)	 and	 2(c)	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 ‘interests	 of	 justice’.15	 At	 most,	 the	
interests	of	 victims	 could	be	defined	more	broadly	 and	eventually	 encompass	 concerns	
with	their	security	and	psychological	well-being	that	would	weigh	against	the	initiation	of	
criminal	proceedings.16	 Yet	 the	 fact	 that	other	 institutions	have	 the	primary	purpose	of	
addressing	peace	and	security	and	alternative	 justice	mechanisms	does	not	exclude	 the	





not	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 initiate	 or	 continue	 criminal	 proceedings	 in	 the	midst	 of	 peace	
negotiations.	 Indeed,	 although	 it	 is	 debatable	 whether	 the	 security	 situation	 on	 the	










justice’,18	 they	can	certainly	be	 relevant	 factors	when	considered	 in	connection	with	an	
ongoing	peace	process	that	has	the	prospect	of	achieving	forms	of	justice	other	than	the	
retributive.	 	 Despite	 this	 connection,	 the	 OTP	 does	 not	 presently	 consider	 that	 the	
security	situation	on	the	ground,	 the	prospects	of	a	successful	prosecution,	or	even	the	
inclusion	of	other	justice	mechanisms	in	a	peace	process	could	be	part	of	the	interests	of	
justice	 analysis,	 not	 even	 in	 connection	with	other	 factors.	 Paradoxically,	 the	office	has	
openly	acknowledged	that	those	two	criteria	must	inform	the	selection	and	prioritization	
of	cases	 for	prosecution,	 in	accordance	with	Article	54(1)(b).19	However,	unlike	 the	OTP	
seems	 to	 suggest,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 separate,	 both	 temporally	 and	 substantially,	 the	
discretion	 that	 the	 Prosecutor	 exercises	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 ‘prioritizing	 cases’	 from	 a	
decision	 to	 initiate	 a	 prosecution	 based	 on	 the	 interests	 of	 justice.20	 The	 two	 happen	
virtually	at	the	same	time	and	are	based	on	the	same	evidence	and	context.	Furthermore,	
the	discretion	used	in	the	selection	and	prioritization	of	cases	does	not	differ,	in	nature	or	
degree,	 from	 the	 one	 that	 the	 Prosecutor	 exercises	when	deciding,	 at	 an	 earlier	 stage,	
whether	or	not	to	proceed	with	an	 investigation	 in	the	 interests	of	 justice.	Significantly,	
by	 removing	 those	 factors	 from	 the	 scope	 of	 Article	 53(1)(c)	 and	 2(c),	 especially	when	




the	broader	project	of	 international	criminal	 justice	would	benefit	enormously	 from	the	




Despite	 the	 OTP’s	 current	 reluctance	 to	 consider	 issues	 of	 peace	 and	 security	 under	
Article	 53(1)(c)	 and	 2(c),	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 and	 increasing	 number	 of	 scholars	 who	
support	the	inclusion	of	those	factors	as	part	of	the	interests	of	justice	test,	on	both	legal	
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security,	 and	 in	particular	peace	negotiations,	 are	broadly	within	 the	 realm	of	 interests	
pursued	by	international	criminal	justice	and	by	the	ICC	itself,	especially	in	the	context	of	
its	deterrent	and	preventive	functions.23	 Indeed,	unlike	some	have	argued,	 it	 is	not	as	 if	
the	‘interests	of	justice’	will	suddenly	be	equated	to	the	broader	‘interests	of	peace’	once	
the	 Prosecutor	 decides	 to	 defer	 an	 investigation	 or	 prosecution	 in	 favor	 of	 peace	
negotiations.24	Rather,	peace	 is	 temporarily	 favored	because	and	to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 is	
also	an	interest	pursued	by	international	criminal	justice.25	Peace	may	not	only	contribute	
to	 better	 justice	 in	 the	 future,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 an	 inherent	 aim	 of	 justice.26	 In	 sum,	
international	 criminal	 justice	 and	 its	 various	 functions	might	 be	 better	 served	 if	 one	 or	
more	 specific	 criminal	 prosecutions	 or	 investigations	 are	 temporarily	 set	 aside	 for	 the	
purposes	of	attempting	a	peace	settlement.		
	 Although	the	OTP	has	refused	to	acknowledge	this	openly,	an	earlier	Policy	Paper	
has	 stressed	 that	 ‘no	 investigation	 can	 be	 initiated	without	 having	 careful	 regard	 to	 all	
circumstances	 prevailing	 in	 the	 country	 or	 region	 concerned,	 including	 the	 nature	 and	
stage	of	the	conflict	and	any	intervention	by	the	international	community.	Furthermore,	
the	Prosecutor	will	have	to	take	into	account	the	practical	realities,	including	questions	of	
security	 on	 the	 ground’.27	 Similarly,	 in	 a	 document	 commissioned	 by	 the	 former	
Prosecutor,	entitled	‘Draft	Regulations	of	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor’,	experts	suggested	
that	 the	 ‘interests	of	 justice’	 should	be	defined	 to	 include	 the	 following	 factors:	 (a)	 the	
start	of	an	investigation	would	exacerbate	or	otherwise	destabilise	a	conflict	situation;	(b)	
the	 start	 of	 an	 investigation	 would	 seriously	 endanger	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 a	
reconciliation	or	peace	process’.28	In	a	more	recent	expert	paper	drafted	upon	request	of	
the	 OTP,	 experts	 suggested	 that	 approaches	 other	 than	 prosecution	 should	 not	 be	
summarily	dismissed	by	the	Prosecutor.29		
We	believe	 that	 this	 is	 a	better	approach	 than	 the	one	adopted	 in	 the	2007	and	
2013	 Policy	 Papers.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 takes	 due	 account	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 factual	
















achievement	 of	 both	 peace	 and	 justice	 in	 the	 long	 run.	 Lastly,	 we	 believe	 that	 this	
approach	 can	 better	 contribute	 to	 addressing	 some	 of	 the	 ICC’s	 present	 challenges	
relating	to	state	cooperation,	budgetary	constraints	and	lengthy	or	complex	proceedings.	
Indeed,	having	an	OTP	that	is	more	willing	to	defer	criminal	proceedings	in	favor	of	peace	
negotiations	 is	 conducive	 to	 more	 state	 cooperation	 and	 overall	 political	 and	 financial	
support	 for	 the	 ICC.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	where	 failure	 to	 cooperate	 is	 due	 to	 a	
state	 preference	 for	 a	 political	 rather	 than	 a	 judicial	 solution	 to	 a	 certain	 conflict	 or	
situation.	Furthermore,	if	the	peace	settlement	turns	out	to	be	successful,	the	initiation	of	
a	 complex	 criminal	 procedure	 would	 be	 avoided,	 with	 all	 the	 financial,	 human	 and	
operational	costs	that	this	would	have	entailed.		
	
4. Useful	 criteria	 for	 assessing	 whether	 peace	 negotiations	 are	 in	 the	 ‘interests	 of	
justice’	in	concrete	cases	
Having	 established	 that	 on	 both	 legal	 and	 policy	 grounds	 the	 ‘interests	 of	 justice’	 test	
should	include	peace	negotiations,	it	is	perhaps	useful	to	draw	some	criteria	or	guidelines	
that	could	assist	the	Prosecutor	in	making	such	an	assessment	in	particular	situations	or	










the	 latter	has	 from	those	 that	have	been	affected	by	 the	conflict	or	 situation,	 including	
the	general	public	in	the	domestic	community	concerned	and,	particularly,	the	victims.31	
Support	 from	 the	 international	 community,	 as	 represented	 by	 groups	 of	 states	 or	














democratic	 governance	 as	 a	 human	 right	 and	 a	 general	 principle	 in	 international	 law.33	
Lastly,	 support	 from	 the	 international	 community	 may	 be	 a	 good	 indicator	 that	 other	
international	 rules	 and	 standards	 are	 being	 complied	 with,	 particularly	 international	
human	 rights	 law.34	 On	 a	 policy	 level,	 it	 appears	 that	 peace	 processes	 that	 have	 the	














For	 a	 peace	 negotiation	 to	 have	 better	 chances	 of	 succeeding	 and	 for	 it	 to	 ensure	 the	
continued	participation	and	approval	of	the	relevant	stakeholders,	it	is	necessary	that	the	






a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 Prosecutor’s	 continued	 assessment	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 peace	
negotiation	 remains	 in	 interests	of	 justice.	 Indeed,	 in	accordance	 in	Article	53(4)	of	 the	
Statute,	 the	 Prosecutor	 can,	 at	 any	 time,	 decide	 to	 resume	 the	 investigation	 or	














Since	 we	 are	 talking	 about	 a	 peace	 negotiation	 being	 in	 ‘the	 interests	 of	 justice’	 it	 is	
crucial	 that	 its	goals	 include	the	achievement	of	 justice	 in	one	or	more	of	the	senses	or	
functions	 that	 we	 mentioned	 earlier,	 i.e.	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 crime	 prevention,	
restoration,	 reparations	or	symbolic	 justice.	 Indeed,	 for	a	political	process	 to	be	able	 to	
contribute	 to	 achievement	 of	 long-lasting	 peace	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 solid	
foundation	for	international	criminal	justice,	it	must,	to	some	extent,	contemplate	one	of	
the	latter’s	aims	or	functions.	In	the	context	of	a	peace	agreement,	a	‘justice	component’,	
in	 this	 broader	 sense,	 can	 include	 the	 following	 non-prosecutorial	 forms	 of	 justice:	 the	
provision	of	reparations	for	victims,	a	broad	judicial	reform,	new	vetting	mechanisms,	the	




As	we	mentioned	 earlier,	 the	 security	 situation	 on	 the	 ground	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 way	 to	
measure,	in	concrete	situations,	whether	a	peace	negotiation	is	indeed	necessary	or	more	
pressing	than	a	prosecutorial	solution	at	a	certain	point	in	time.37	In	particular,	if	the	risk	
of	 escalation	 of	 violence	 is	 high,	 whether	 it	 is	 due	 to	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	 criminal	
proceedings	 or	 not,	 then	 it	 might	 be	 necessary	 and	 appropriate	 give	 some	 space	 to	 a	
political	settlement.		
Some	 commentators	 have	 referred	 to	 this	 criterion	 within	 the	 broader	
consideration	of	the	‘necessity’	of	setting	aside	the	investigation	or	prosecution.38	Indeed,	
given	the	exceptional	nature	of	an	interests	of	justice	decision,39	necessity	is	an	overriding	
criterion	 to	 be	 considered	when	 balancing	 all	 the	 specific	 factors	 coming	within	 Article	
53(1)(c)	and	2(c).	Necessity	 tells	us	 that	 it	 is	only	when	the	 investigation	or	prosecution	
cannot	be	carried	out,	i.e.	when	a	deferral	is	the	only	means	to	ensure	that	the	‘interests	
of	justice’	are	satisfied,	that	a	decision	pursuant	to	Article	53(1)(c)	and	2(c)	can	be	made.40	






























As	 we	 mentioned	 earlier,	 the	 prospects	 of	 a	 successful	 prosecution	 are	 already	 being	
considered	by	the	Prosecutor	as	part	of	her	case	selection	and	prioritization	strategy,	i.e.	
when	 selecting	which	prosecutions	 to	 initiate	 after	 conducting	 investigations.	However,	
we	believe	that	this	criterion	should	also	inform	the	evaluation	of	whether	or	not	it	is	in	
the	 interests	 of	 justice	 to	 suspend	 an	 investigation	 or	 prosecution	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
attempting	a	peace	negotiation.	This	is	because,	if	the	prospects	of	conducting	successful	
investigations	 or	 prosecution	 are	 low,	 especially	 due	 to	 an	 ongoing	 armed	 conflict	 or	
difficult	 security	 conditions	 on	 the	 ground,	 this	 should	 weigh	 in	 favor	 of	 attempting	 a	
peace	 negotiation.	 Indeed,	 in	 those	 circumstances,	 allowing	 some	 space	 for	 a	 political	
solution	 can	 either	 avoid	 the	 initiation	 of	 a	 disastrous	 investigation	 or	 prosecution,	 or	
allow	 successful	 prosecutions	 to	 be	 established	 in	 the	 future.	 Thus,	 the	 prospects	 of	 a	
successful	investigation	or	prosecution	can	also	be	a	relevant	criterion	for	evaluating	the	
appropriateness	of	a	peace	negotiation	under	Article	53(1)(c)	and	2(c).44		
By	 ‘successful	 investigation	 or	 prosecution’	 we	 not	 only	 mean	 those	 that	 will	
eventually	 lead	 to	 a	 conviction.	 Rather,	 in	 the	 present	 context,	 being	 successful	means	











the	 ground;	 ii)	 state	 cooperation	 in	 allowing	 access	 to	 evidence;	 iii)	 complexity	 of	
documentary	 evidence,	 including	 translation,	 volume	 and	 content;	 iv)	 difficulties	 with	
obtaining	witness	or	expert	testimony.45	Aside	from	evidentiary	considerations,	prospects	
of	 success	 also	 include	 proceedings	 that	 the	 Prosecutor	 foresees	 will	 run	 smoothly.	

















predict	 of	 all	 factual	 considerations	 that	may	 come	within	 the	 scope	 of	 Article	 53(1)(c)	
and	 2(c).	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 various	 criteria	 suggested	 above	 overlap	
among	 themselves	 and	with	 other	 factors	 that	 are	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 recognized	 in	
Article	53(1)(c)	and	2(c).	In	any	event,	the	point	is	that	clear	guidelines,	and	in	particular,	
examples	of	criteria	to	be	taken	 into	account	by	the	Prosecutor	 in	the	context	of	peace	















decision	not	 to	 initiate	 an	 investigation	or	 prosecution	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 justice	would	
prevent	or	alleviate,	at	least	in	part,	some	of	the	current	challenges	that	the	ICC	has	faced	
in	terms	of	state	cooperation,	budgetary	restrictions	and	length	or	complexity	of	criminal	
proceedings.	 Moreover,	 in	 practical	 terms,	 this	 reform	 would	 require	 very	 little	
operational	or	 financial	 resources.	 Indeed,	aside	 from	a	change	of	heart	within	 the	OTP	
(which	is	arguably	the	most	difficult	part),	all	that	our	proposed	reform	would	require	is	
the	revision	of	the	existing	Policy	Papers	issued	by	the	Office	on	the	interests	of	justice.	A	
new	Policy	Paper	on	 this	question	 should	be	drafted	and	published	 to	explicitly	 include	
peace	and	security	considerations	and,	in	particular,	peace	negotiations	together	with	the	
more	specific	criteria	suggested	above.	These	could	be	incorporated	in	the	form	of	clear	
guidelines.	This	reform	would	take	very	little	time	and	effort,	and	yet	it	could	contribute	
to	making	the	next	10	years	of	the	Rome	Statute	less	turbulent	than	its	first	20.							
	
	
